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Abstract 
This working paper presents preliminary ideas of five 
possible text-based notations for representing safety cases, 
which may be easier for non-graphically inclined people to 
use and understand than the currently popular graphics-based 
representations. 
1 Introduction 
One does not have to subscribe to the complete tenets of any 
particular theory of learning styles to recognize that some 
people prefer visual presentation of information and other 
people prefer verbal presentation.   For the former, “a picture 
is worth a thousand pictures” [17]; but for the later, “a word is 
worth a thousand pictures” [3]. 
 
Currently, the most well-known notations for describing 
safety cases are graphics-based.  The Goal-Structuring 
Notation (GSN) is a prototypical example of such a notation 
[12].  It uses a small set of graphical elements, annotated with 
text, and connected by directed lines to represent the elements 
of a safety argument and the relationships among these 
elements.  Advocates of GSN (and similar notations) assert 
that graphical representations simplify the construction and 
managing of safety arguments and facilitate the presentation 
of these arguments to others (see for example [4, 20, 22]). 
 
These assertions are almost certainly true for those members 
of the population who are predisposed to a visual learning 
style.   For such people, a picture is worth a thousand words.  
They are likely to find a GSN representation of an argument 
easy to create and understand, particularly when compared to 
a non-graphical representation of the same argument.  
 
But, what about those people who do not have a visual 
learning style; those who prefer words to pictures?  Such 
people seem likely to find a GSN representation of an 
argument confusing, or at the very least, unappealing, and 
may struggle to create these representations of their own 
arguments.   This is certainly true for me. 
 
In this paper, I sketch five styles of text-based representations 
for safety arguments, and conclude with brief, preliminary, 
subjective observations about possible next steps to take. 
2 Background 
This section provides a brief introduction to safety cases and 
to GSN.  Readers already familiar with these concepts may 
wish to skip to the next section. 
2.1 Safety cases 
For the development and certification of safety critical 
software systems, a move away from process-based standards 
towards evidence-based standards has begun in some 
countries, and is strongly advocated in others [10].  Instead of 
requiring adherence to particular constraints on the process by 
which a system is developed, an evidence-based approach 
requires the creation of a safety case for the system.  A safety 
case consists of explicit safety requirements, the evidence that 
the requirements have been met, and the argument linking the 
evidence to the requirements.  Both the argument and the 
evidence are essential.  An argument without adequate 
supporting evidence is, or at least should be, unconvincing.  A 
body of evidence without an argument is unexplained.  In 
both cases, knowing whether the system’s safety requirements 
have been met is difficult [21]. 
2.2 Goal-Structuring Notation 
This paper uses GSN as the example graphics-based notation 
for expressing safety cases.    Some of the primary symbols of 
the notation are illustrated in figure 1, and explained below 
[6]: 
 
• A goal states a claim (or, for those who prefer 
different words, proposition or statement) that is to 
be established by an argument.   A GSN diagram 
(called a goal structure) will usually have a top-level 
goal, which will often be decomposed into more 
goals.   
• A strategy describes the method used to decompose 
a goal into additional goals. 
• A solution describes the evidence that a goal has 
been met. 
• The context associated with another GSN element 
lists information that is relevant to that element.  For 
example, the context of a particular goal might 
provide definitions necessary to understand the 
meaning of the goal. 
• An assumption is a statement that is taken to be true, 
without further argument or explanation. 
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• A justification explains why a solution provides 




Figure 1: Some elements of GSN 
 
To construct an argument, the elements of the GSN notation 
are linked together using directed lines.  An example of a 
safety argument goal structure is shown in figure 2 (based on 
[14]). 
 
This goal structure is necessarily fairly simple; however it 
does contain sufficient detail and variety to serve as the basis 
for showing what a safety case argument might look like in 
each of the text-based notations described in the next section. 
3 Text-based Notations 
In this section five text-based notations for expressing 
arguments are described.  
3.1 Normal Prose 
Law and philosophy are two disciplines that are particularly 
concerned with the construction and expression of coherent, 
cogent arguments.  In both disciplines, normal prose is the 
most common medium of expression (as examples see [1, 8, 
9, 13]).  Although the use of graphical notations has been 
researched in these fields, and it continues to be researched 
[2], such notations have generally not found much favour.  
Court opinions, legal briefs, law review articles, and law 
books consist almost entirely of prose, albeit sometimes 
rather  bland, and heavily footnoted prose.  Philosophical 
writings are similar.  Except for the occasional diagram,  one 






Safety case arguments may also be written in normal prose.  
Shown below is one way that the safety argument of figure 2 
may be expressed in prose. 
 
The control system is acceptably safe, given a 
definition of acceptably safe, because all identified 
hazards have been eliminated or sufficiently mitigated 
and the software has been developed to the integrity 
levels appropriate to the hazards involved. 
 
Given both the tolerability targets for hazards (from 
reference Z), and the list of hazards identified from 
the functional hazard analysis (from reference Y), we 
can show that all identified hazards have been 
identified or sufficiently mitigated by arguing over all 
three of the identified hazards: H1, H2, and H3. 
 
We know from the formal verification we conducted 
that H1 has been eliminated.     
 
We know that catastrophic hazard H2 has been 
sufficiently mitigated because fault tree analysis 
shows that its probability of occurrence is less than 
1x10-6 per annum, and the acceptable probability in 
our environment for a catastrophic hazard is 1x10-6 
per annum. 
 
We know that major hazard H3 has been sufficiently 
mitigated because fault tree analysis shows that its 
probability of occurrence is the less than the 1x10-3 
per annum permitted for the occurrence of a major 
hazard. 
 
Given the list of hazards identified from the functional 
hazard analysis in reference Y, and the integrity level 
(IL) process guidelines defined in reference X, we can 
show that the software has been developed to the 
integrity level appropriate to the hazards involved.  
First, the process evidence for the primary protection 
system shows that it was developed to the required IL 
4.  Second, the process evidence for the secondary 
protection system shows that it was developed to the 
required IL 2. 
3.2 Structured Prose 
One common criticism, among several, of prose safety 
arguments is that the structure of the argument may be lost 
among all the words1.  One way to address this criticism is 
add some explicit structure to the prose. A structured prose 
presentation of an argument reduces the freedom of 
expression possible in normal prose by requiring that the 
critical parts of the argument be explicitly denoted.   
                                                          
1 Without a doubt it is possible to obscure an argument within 
prose; however, that possibility does not have to be realized.  
In previous work, the most cogent, easy to understand safety 
case was presented in prose [7]. 
The example below uses slightly modified GSN-inspired 
terminology for denotation purposes (‘claim’ instead of 
‘goal’, and ‘evidence’ instead of ‘solution’). 
 
This argument establishes the following claim: the 
control system is acceptably safe, within the context 
of a definition of acceptably safe. To establish the 
top-level claim, two sub-claims are established: (1) 
all identified hazards have been eliminated or 
sufficiently mitigated and (2) the software has been 
developed to the integrity levels appropriate to the 
hazards involved. 
 
Within the context of the tolerability targets for 
hazards (from reference Z) and the list of hazards 
identified from the functional hazard analysis (from 
reference Y), we follow the strategy of arguing over 
all three of the identified hazards (H1, H2, and H3) to 
establish sub-claim 1, yielding three additional 
claims: H1 has been eliminated; H2 has been 
sufficiently mitigated; and H3 has been sufficiently 
mitigated. 
 
The evidence that H1 has been eliminated is formal 
verification. 
 
The evidence that catastrophic hazard H2 has been 
sufficiently mitigated is a fault tree analysis showing 
that its probability of occurrence is less than 1x10-6 
per annum. The justification for using this evidence 
is that the acceptable probability in our environment 
for a catastrophic hazard is 1x10-6 per annum. 
 
The evidence that the major hazard H3 has been 
sufficiently mitigated is a fault tree analysis showing 
that its probability of occurrence is less than 1x10-3 
per annum. The justification for using this evidence 
is that the acceptable probability in our environment 
for a major hazard is 1x10-3 per annum. 
 
We establish sub-claim (2) within the context of the 
list of hazards identified from the functional hazard 
analysis in reference Y, and the integrity level (IL) 
process guidelines defined in reference X.   The 
process evidence shows that the primary protection 
system was developed to the required IL 4.  The 
process evidence also shows that the secondary 
protection system was developed to the required IL 2. 
3.3 Argument Outline 
The structure of the argument may be made even more 
explicit by adopting an outline format.  With such a format, 
simple declarative language is used, similar to the text 
contained within a GSN element.  Indentation, numbering, 
and font changes may also be used to help emphasize the 
overall argument structure. As with outlines in general, 
several different specific formats are possible.  The format 
chosen for the example below is similar but not identical to 
the format suggested in [16]. 
 
Claim 1:  Control system is acceptably safe. 
Context 1:  Definition of acceptably safe. 
 
 Claim 1.1:  All identified hazards have been  
    eliminated or sufficiently mitigated. 
 Context 1.1-a: Tolerability targets for hazards  
     (reference Z). 
 Context 1.1-b:  Hazards identified from functional  
     hazard analysis (reference Y). 
 
 Strategy 1.1: Argument over all identified  
     hazards (H1, H2, H3) 
 
  Claim 1.1.1:  H1 has been eliminated. 
  Evidence 1.1.1: Formal verification 
 
  Claim 1.1.2:  Probability of H2 occurring  
      < 1x10-6 per annum. 
  Justification 1.1.2:  1x10-6 per annum limit for  
           catastrophic hazards. 
  Evidence 1.1.2.: Fault Tree analysis. 
 
  Claim 1.1.3:  Probability of H3 occurring  
      < 1x10-3 per annum. 
  Justification 1.1.3:  1x10-3 per annum limit for  
           major hazards. 
  Evidence 1.1.3: Fault tree analysis. 
 
 Claim 1.2: The software has been developed  
    to the integrity level appropriate to 
    the  hazards involved. 
 Context 1.2-a:  (same as Context 1.1-b) 
 Context 1.2-b:  Integrity level (IL) process 
     guidelines defined by reference X. 
 
  Claim 1.2.1:  Primary protection system  
      developed to IL 4. 
  Evidence 1.2.1:  Process evidence of IL 4 
 
  Claim 1.2.2:  Secondary protection 
      system developed to IL 2. 
  Evidence 1.2.2: Process evidence of IL 2. 
 
3.4 Mathematical Proof 
Although geometric proofs are the bane of many secondary 
school students, the basic format employed in them is 
appropriate for consideration as a format for expressing safety 
case arguments.  The following instantiation of the argument 
from figure 2 shows one way in which this could be done.   
There are two departures from the typical proof approach.  
The first departure is that the word ‘establish’ is used instead 
of ‘prove’.  This is because safety arguments are rarely, if 
ever, deductive (and thus have conclusions that may be 
proved in the sense used in geometry); instead the arguments 
are inductive (and thus have conclusions that may only be 
established to some level of confidence) [5]. The second 
departure is that the top-down nature of the safety argument is 




SystemSafe: Control system is acceptably safe 
 
Given: 
A. Definition of acceptably safe. 
 
Statements Reasons 
1. All identified hazards 




2. The software has 
been developed to the 
integrity level 










HazardsHandled: All identified hazards have been 
eliminated or sufficiently mitigated 
 
Given: 
A. Tolerability targets for hazards (reference Z). 
B. Hazards identified from functional hazard analysis 
(reference Y). 
 
By: Arguing over all identified hazards (H1, H2, H3) 
 
Statements Reasons 
1. H1 has been 
eliminated 
1. formal verification 
2. p(H2) < 1x10-6 per 
annum (p.a.) 
2. fault tree analysis 
3. Upper limit on 
permitted catastrophic 
hazard occurrence is 
1x10-6 p.a. 
3. Given (A) 
4. H2 has been 
mitigated 
4. 2, 3 
5. p(H3) < 1x10-3 p. a. 5. fault tree analysis 
6. Upper limit on 
permitted probability of 
a major hazard 
occurrence is 1x10-3 
p.a. 
6. Given (A) 
7. H3 has been 
mitigated 
7. 5, 6 
8. All identified hazards 
have been eliminated or 
sufficiently mitigated 
8. Given (B), 4, 7 
Establish: 
ProcessAcceptable: The software has been 




A. Integrity level process guidelines defined by 
reference X. 




1. Primary protection 
system has hazards 
requiring development to 
integrity level 4 
1. Given (A, B) 
2. Primary protection 
system developed to 
integrity level 4 
2. Process evidence of 
integrity level 4 
3. Primary protection 
system developed to 
appropriate level 
3. 1, 2 
4. Secondary protection 
has hazards requiring 
development to integrity 
level 2 
4. Given (A, B) 
5. Secondary protection 
developed to integrity 
level 2 
5. Process evidence of 
integrity level 2 
6. Secondary protection 
system developed to 
appropriate level 
6. 4, 5 
7. The software has 
been developed to the 
integrity level appropriate 
to the hazards identified 
7.  3, 6  
 
 
3.5 LISP Style 
The fifth text-based representation for safety case arguments 
is one based on the programming language LISP [18].  LISP-
based notations have been employed in a wide range of 
applications over the years, including the theorem proving 
system ACL2 (A Computational Logic for Applicative 
Common LISP) [11].   
 
The example below presents one way of describing the 
argument of figure 2 using a LISP style notation.  Note that 
that short names, rather than full text, are used for the 
argument contents.  The standard names used throughout this 
paper for the GSN element types also used (claim, context, 
etc.).  In analogy to functions or operators in a LISP program, 
these appear at the beginning of a parenthesized list, and 
should be thought of as applying to everything that follows 





   (claim SystemSafe 
       (context FHAHazards 
           (context Targets 
               (claim HazardsHandled 
                    (strategy ArgOveHaz 
                        (claim H1Elim 
                            (evidence H1Evidence)) 
                        (claim H2OK 
                            (justification CatHaz) 
                            (evidence FTA)) 
                        (claim H3OK 
                            (justification MajHaz) 
                            (evidence FTA))))) 
           (context ILGuidelines 
               (claim ProcessAcceptable 
                    (claim PrimIL4 
                        (evidence IL4Evidence)) 
                    (claim SecIL2 
                        (evidence IL2Evidence))))))) 
 
4 Concluding Remarks 
My work to date in this area has consisted in creating the five 
examples presented above, with specific concentration on 
developing the mathematical proof and LISP style 
representations.  Careful analysis and evaluation of the 
efficacy of these representations has not been done, but I will 
conclude this paper with two observations and an opinion 
based on the work completed so far. 
 
One observation is that any evaluation of a notation for 
representing safety arguments must consider a host of 
questions, including the following: 
 
• Which is worse: an argument that fails to convince 
others that a claim is satisfied when it is satisfied, or 
an argument that falsely convinces others that a 
claim is satisfied when it is not? 
• Which is most important:  ease of argument creation, 
perspicuity of a created argument, manual analysis 
of an argument, automated analysis of an argument, 
or ease of argument maintenance? 
• Who is the intended audience for the argument?   
• How is the intended audience distributed in regards 
to preferences for visual or verbal information? 
• If the notation is primarily intended for visual 
people, in what ways does it accommodate verbal 
people?   And vice versa? 
 
The other observation is that devising an experiment that 
would take into account these questions to evaluate 
adequately the benefits and disadvantages of several different 
representations for safety arguments is a very difficult task.  
Which probably explains why it has apparently not been done 
yet. 
The opinion is that eventually the safety community will 
settle on some form of text-based notation as the primary 
means for creating, analyzing, and manipulating safety-cases, 
with graphical representations serving only an auxiliary role. 
Only time will tell if this opinion turns out to be right, but 
history in philosophical and legal argument is on its side. 
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